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Ownership, control, compensation and restructuring of Estonian 
enterprises  -  preliminary results from a manager survey 
 
1. Background for the survey and research questions 
The manager survey is part of an ongoing research project on governance and 
enterprise restructuring. We have made studies on ownership and economic 
performance for a large sample of companies in the Baltic States based on 
ownership surveys and data from balance sheets and income statements as reported 
to the statistical departments. However, we needed deeper knowledge about the 
extent to which ownership actually meant dominant control by the group of 
majority owners or to what extend the managers dominated both strategic and 
operational decisions in the enterprise. We also needed deeper information on the 
questions connected to compensation systems for managers and other employees 
and we wanted more information about different indicators of restructuring.  
 
The main research questions concern the variation on different types of ownership, 
which is divided in majority ownership by state, foreign, domestic external, 
managers, other employees or no majority. The survey also distinguishes between 
different origins based on information from the 1995 ownership survey. The origins 
can be divided into: still state owned, privatized, cooperatives, or established 
directly as new private firms. The last category also includes “new cooperatives” 
established in the end of the 1980’es and the start of the 1990’es. 
 
The research questions concern the relation between ownership structures on one 
side and on the other side: 1: the relation between ownership and control; 2: 
compensation systems for managers and other employees; and 3: different forms of 
restructuring. 
 
1. How is the relation between difference types of ownership and the influence of 
different groups?  How is the owners’ governance of managers? 
Sub-questions: 
1a. Is there correspondence between the type of owners and their representation in 
the company boards.  
1b. How strong is the managers’ position in the board?  
1c. How do the managers perceive the influence of different groups on different 
decision areas both covering operational and the strategic decision levels? 
1.d To what degree are the employees members of unions?  
1 e. What are the most important channels for employee influence?  
2. How do the compensation systems for managers and other employees vary with 
the different type of ownership structures?   
3. Do the degree and type of restructuring vary over time and between the different 
types of ownership?  
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2. The Estonian Manager Survey 
The survey was done in cooperation with the Estonian Statistical Office (ESA). The 
instrument was designed by Niels Mygind. The first 3 pilot surveys were done in 
November 1996 and a second version with 8 pilot surveys was done in February-
March 1997. The final survey was done with 181 interviews in November/ 
December 1997 and 31 interviews in the summer of 1998. The survey scheme was 
made both in an English, an Estonian, and a Russian version with cross-checking 
for the quality of the translations. The English version is enclosed in the appendix.  
 
The instrument includes 18 main questions, often divided in sub-questions (total 
75) and most of these divided on five years 1993-1997. In total there are 348 entries 
for the enterprises being able to answer all questions for all years. 
 
The sample of enterprises was based on the GEREE Estonian database including 
388 for which we had ownership data for all five years 1995-1997. The 
questionnaires were sent to the top-managers, but most interviews were done on 
location and some by phone. The total response was 220 including 8 of the pilots. 
 
In the following overview over the results we have for a few of the questions 
included some information from the earlier ownership-surveys, which the Estonian 
Statistical Office also did for our project. The report follows roughly the order of 
questions in the survey-scheme. However, first we give an overview over the data 
set and the distribution on origin, majority ownership, size and branch. The origin 
and ownership structure are used in many of the following tables showing the 
relation between different variables and ownership. Then we look at the 
management and board structure seen in relation to the ownership structure. In the 
following section we look at the different compensation systems used in the 
different companies. Then we report the different types of restructuring. Finally we 
look at labor-management relations and the control-structure in the company as 
perceived by the respondent - typically the top-manager of the enterprise. 
 
Much of the information included in the survey will be more deeply analyzed in 
later econometric studies. This working-paper is written to give an overview over 
preliminary results, to define new hypotheses and to make a comparison with 
similar surveys for Latvia and Lithuania. 
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3. Privatization, Ownershipstructure, Size and Branch. 
 
Table 1  Ownership on origin (privatization/new/coop)   data from ownership-survey 
 
state 
 
\ownership 1995 
foreign domes-
tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee 
no ma-
jority 
total 
 privatized 8 16 12 18 0 53
 new 24 18 28 10 6 86
 coops 1 28 2 7 2 40
38 total including state  217
 \ownership 1996  
 privatized 9 24 16 18 1 68
 new 23 19 25 13 5 85
 coops 1 26 4 8 1 40
12 total including state  205
 \ownership 1997  
 privatized 10 25 17 12 7 70
 new 24 19 28 6 6 83
 coops 2 23 5 8 1 39
9 total including state  201
 
Table 2   Ownership/origin on industry   1997       data from ownership-survey 
    \majority ownership 
industry 
state  fo-
reign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no 
major.
total priva-
tized 
new coop Estonia
total 
agriculture & fishing 0 0 6 0 8 1 15 2 3 10 1492
mining, wood, chemicals 0 4 19 8 5 1 37 17 12 9 48*
manufacturing  4 12 17 8 6 3 50 17 23 5 3824
construction  1 3 9 9 1 0 23 14 6 4 1959
whole trade & retail   1 2 2 7 1 0 13 5 7 0 11563
hotels & restaurants 1 11 10 9 3 3 37 6 22 5 988
transport,communication 1 3 8 10 2 1 25 1** 9 5 1574
total 8 35 71 51 26 9 200 62** 82 38
** 1995?  state?  Estonia total for Financial statistics of enterprises, ESA, *only mining 
 
The 10 new employee owned enterprises in 1995 are “new cooperatives” started 
in the Gorbatjov period. Note, that they are not included in the group of origin as 
cooperatives, which includes more traditional producer cooperatives in 
agriculture, fishing and transportion. In agriculture, fishing, mining and forestry 
these cooperatives can be majority owned by the employees. Probably most of 
the 8 majority employee owned in fishing are traditional cooperatives of the 
kolkhoz type. However, they can also be owned by suppliers and in this case 
included as domestic externally owned enterprises. There are not included any 
cooperatives related to trade. 
 
Most of the new enterprises are either foreign or management owned, while 
external domestic and employee ownership have a stronger weight of privatized 
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enterprises. 
 
Table 3. Number of Employed Persons Ultimo 
                 \ownership 
average per enterprise 
state  fo-
reign  
domes
-tic  
mana-
ger  
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
employees 1995 N=179 474 72 103 57 97 15 88 187 48 90
employees 1996 N=199 348 106 118 85 63 12 95 178 50 78
employees 1997 N=195 31 90 125 49 53 43 84 159 49 72
of which managers 2 5 4 4 3 3 4 6 3 3
              other employees 29 85 121 45 50 40 80 153 46 69
total 97 23.849 1-19 0 14 12 13 7 6 52 4 37 7
 2.359 20-49 1 9 15 21 7 0 53 21 19 12
  858 50-99 0 7 17 14 9 0 47 11 21 9
 399 100-199 0 2 14 4 3 2 25 11 3 7
 162 200- 0 5 12 1 0 0 18 11 3 3
             27.627 N 1 37 70 53 26 8 195 59 83 39
Foreign owned enterprises are over represented in both the small end and the large 
end of scale, but the average size follows the total group. Management owned and 
employee owned enterprises can be found mostly in the smaller end and they have 
an average employment below the average for the total group. The privatized are 
larger than the new enterprises and cooperatives are in between. State owned 
enterprises and employee owned enterprises are typically quite large. However, it is 
worth noting that some privatized enterprises are quite small, less than 50 (42%) 
and some new are quite large, with 50 or more employees (32%). This indicates a 
considerable lack of validity in studies like the World Bank (2002), which make the 
distinction between new and privatized only based on the number of employees. 
 
Table 4. Distribution of Ownership on Employees 
                  \ ownership 
average per enterprise 
state  foreign domes
-tic  
mana-
ger  
em-
ployee 
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
% nonowning 
employees 
1995 
   N 
86 
(31) 
96 
(32) 
67 
(61) 
81 
(42) 
45 
(33) 
73   
(8) 
72 
(185) 
68 
(51) 
84 
(86) 
55 
(40) 
% nonowning 
employees 
1996 
   N 
- 97 
(34) 
81 
(72) 
81 
(47) 
49 
(37) 
63   
(8) 
77 
(207) 
80 
(62) 
84 
(85) 
60 
(40) 
% nonowning 
employees 
1997 
   N 
- 96 
(37) 
82 
(70) 
75 
(53) 
44 
(26) 
75   
(8) 
79 
(203) 
81 
(59) 
82 
(83) 
66 
(39) 
distribution of shares on employee owners 1997  **if we have data or 1995? 
rather equal 
 
 
(Pct) 
0  5   
(56) 
20 
(53) 
27 
(51) 
10 
(39) 
5   
(83) 
67 
(51) 
16 
(39) 
34 
(60) 
12  
(44) 
unequal (more than 1:2) 
(Pct) 
0 5   
(22) 
6   
(15) 
12  
(23) 
9   
(34) 
0     
(0) 
29  
(22) 
9   
(22) 
14  
(25) 
6   
(23) 
very unequal (> 1:10) 
(Pct) 
0 5   
(22) 
12 
(32) 
14 
(26) 
7   
(27) 
1   
(17) 
36 
(27) 
16 
(39) 
9   
(15) 
9   
(33) 
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N  0 9 38 53 26 6 132 41 57 27 
Table 4 indicates that minority employee ownership is less frequent in foreign 
owned enterprises and most frequent in management owned and non-majority 
enterprises.  
 
The lowest percentage of non-owning employees is found in enterprises with 
employee majority ownership. The last columns show that there are on average 
more employee owners in cooperatives than in new and privatized enterprises. 
 
Looking at the distribution among the employee owners it is striking that the 
employee owned enterprises are mainly found in the middle category, while it has 
the lowest frequency for the category of "rather equal". The explanation might be 
that in employee owned enterprises there are more owners and more shares owned 
by employees opening up for a wide specter and thus higher inequality between the 
highest and the smallest ownership share. (Quite similar to the results from Latvia). 
New enterprises have a quite high degree of equality among the employee owners. 
This can partly be explained by the inclusion of “new cooperatives” in this group. 
 
Table 5-95  Ownergroups and minority ownership by other groups 1995   
        \ majority ownership 
average % owned by  
 
state 
 
fo-
reign 
 
do-
mestic
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
state/municipal     
foreign     
domestic external owner     
managers     
other employees     
total 
 
  100   100   100   100  100  100
 
  100 
 
100 100 100
  
Table 5-97  Ownergroups and minority ownership by other groups 1997   
        \ majority ownership 
average % owned by  
 
state 
 
fo-
reign 
 
do-
mestic
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
state/municipal     
foreign     
domestic external owner     
managers     
other employees     
total 
 
  100   100   100   100  100  100
 
  100 
 
100 100 100
all companies have the same weight when measuring the average 
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4.  Board structure and management 
Table Q1A   Who appointed top-management            (frequency and column %)    
        \ ownership 1997 
manager appointed by 
state  foreign domes-
tic  
mana-
ger  
em-
ployee 
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
state authority 0 (0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(4) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(0,5) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
 
labor collective 0 (0) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(4) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
 
shareholders 3 (33) 
9 
(24) 
20 
(27) 
22 
(41) 
10 
(37) 
5 
(56) 
69 
(32) 
20 
(26) 
26 
(29) 
19 
(48) 
 
company board 6 (67) 
24 
(63) 
45 
(61) 
24 
(45) 
14 
(51) 
2    
(22) 
115 
(55) 
47 
(64) 
49 
(56) 
16 
(40) 
 
other 0 (0) 
5 
(13) 
8 
(11) 
8 
(14) 
1 
(4) 
2    
(22) 
24 
(11,5) 
6 
(8) 
12 
(14) 
5 
(12) 
 
total N  9 (100) 
38 
(100) 
74 
(100) 
54 
(100) 
27 
(100) 
9 
(100) 
211 
(100) 
75 
(100) 
87 
(100) 
40 
(100)
In all types of enterprises, except the small group with no majority, the company 
board had the dominating role concerning appointment of management. However, 
for about a third of enterprises the appointment has probably been discussed at the 
general assembly since the shareholders are mentioned as the group appointing the 
manager.  
Table Q1.B    When was top-management appointed   (frequency and column %)  
    \ownership 1997 
manager appointed  
state   foreign domes-
tic  
manager em-
ployee 
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
 
-1989 0 
(0) 
1 
(2) 
3 
(4) 
3 
(6) 
2 
(7) 
0 
(0) 
9 
(4) 
3 
(3) 
3 
(3) 
1 
(2) 
 
1990 0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
6 
(11) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(11) 
8 
(4) 
2 
(2) 
6 
(7) 
1 
(2) 
 
1991 1 
(11) 
4 
(11) 
6 
(8) 
10 
(19) 
2 
(7) 
1 
(11) 
24 
(11) 
9 
(12) 
14 
(16) 
2 
(5) 
 
1992 0 
(0) 
12 
(32) 
8 
(11) 
12 
(22) 
7 
(26) 
4 
(45) 
43 
(20) 
11 
(14) 
24 
(28) 
7 
(17)
 
1993 0 
(0) 
3 
(8) 
12 
(16) 
7 
(13) 
7 
(26) 
0 
(0) 
29 
(14) 
9 
(12) 
12 
(14) 
9 
(22)
 
1994 1 
(11) 
8 
(21) 
7 
(9) 
7 
(7) 
2 
(7) 
0 
(0) 
22 
(10) 
9 
(12) 
7 
(8) 
4 
(10)
 
1995 2 
(22) 
6 
(16) 
15 
(20) 
2 
(4) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
25 
(12) 
13 
(17) 
5 
(6) 
3 
(7) 
 
1996 3 
(34) 
2 
(5) 
14 
(19) 
6 
(11) 
4 
(15) 
0 
(0) 
29 
(14) 
13 
(17) 
7 
(8) 
8 
(20)
 
1997 2 
(22) 
2 
(5) 
8 
(11) 
4 
(7) 
3 
(11) 
3 
(33) 
22 
(11) 
6 
(8) 
9 
(10) 
5 
(13)
 
total N 9 
(100) 
38 
(100) 
74 
(100) 
54 
(100) 
27 
(100) 
9 
(100) 
211 
(100) 
75 
(100) 
87 
(100)
40 
(100)
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It is worth noting that for all the groups very few managers were appointed before 
the independence from Soviet Union. It is remarkable that all managers in state 
owned enterprises have been appointed in 1991 or after, in fact, 8 out of 9 have 
been appointed after 1993 and the peak is as late as 1996. The peak of appointments 
is around 1992 for most of the other groups with manager owned enterprises having 
on average the longest manager tenure. Privatized enterprises have changed 
managers more recently than new enterprises. This indicates that managers have a 
relatively strong position in new enterprises, which are often owned by themselves, 
and that managers often have been changed in connection with privatization. 
 
(note, interesting to analyze in relation to year of privatization/establishment 
** make a matrix table for each owner category (except state) and for 
privatized/new). If there is high correspondence I will only include the tables for 
private and new in the text. 
 
Table Q2.1-95 Composition of company board 1995 on 1995 ownership   
            \ ownership  
average %seats representing 
 
state 
 
fo-
reign 
 
do-
mestic
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
state/municipal   10    7    4     3   2    0    4 6 3 2 
foreign    11  63    7    0    0    17    13 7 17 2 
domestic external owner    21    6   39    13    6   13   18 13 17 21 
managers    34   16    25    49   42   44    35 35 31 40 
other employees    24     8    25    35   50   26    30 39 32 35 
total   100   100   100   100  100  100   100 100 100 100 
total N with seats > 1     30    27    51    32   30    5   175 61 69 32 
average number of seats 
**include 1 decimal 
    3    3    4    3    5    2    4    6    5    5
 
N seats = 0 / no answer 
**include seat=1 
    5    2    8   5    3    2   25    6    11    6
Table Q2.1-97 Composition of company board 1997 on 1997 ownership  
            \ ownership 1997 
average %seats representing 
 
state  
 
fo-
reign 
 
do-
mestic
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
state/municipal     8     6    2    4    5   0    4    3    3    5 
foreign    20    53    2    2    0    14    13    9   29   1 
domestic external owner    23    10   35   14    11    33   21   18   18   31 
managers    30    25   33   47   44   36   36   41    26    26 
other employees   19     6   28    33   40   17   26   29   24   37 
total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
total N with seats > 1     6     33   57   40  21     5  162   62   64   31 
average number of seats    3    3     3     3     4     2     3     4     3     4 
N seats =0 or no answer     0     0     4     3     1     1     9     1     8     1
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There is a clear connection between representation in the company board and 
majority ownership for all owner-groups except state owned companies, which are 
represented by a broad specter of other groups. In all the other groups for both 
years the majority owner has the highest representation in the board with the 
following exceptions. Domestic external ownership managers have in 1997 nearly 
the same level of representation as the external owners. Foreign owners are strongly 
represented in foreign owned companies (=Latvia). Employees are represented by 
40% in companies with employee majority ownership, however just passed by 
management representatives in 1997.  
 
Managers seem to have a quite strong presence in the company boards in all types 
of ownership structures with the lowest proportion in foreign owned enterprises 
(=Latvia) and the highest in state and insider owned enterprises. The state on the 
other hand has the lowest representation (=Latvia). Other employees are also quite 
strongly represented in all types of companies except foreign owned. Taken 
together the insiders are completely dominating the boards in insider owned 
enterprises (>80%).  
 
It is notable that managers plus other employees in 1997 also on average have a 
majority in the board in domestic externally owned (51%) and in no-majority 
enterprises (53%). In state owned enterprises they are as high as 49%. The three 
groups of origin follow to a high degree the pattern of the underlying ownership 
groups. Foreign representatives are more frequent in new enterprises and external 
domestic representatives are more frequent in cooperatives. 
 
The tables Q2.2-95 and -97 represent matrices combining the majority of board 
representation with majority ownership. The shaded diagonal describes the situation 
where majority ownership follows majority board control. For 1995 there is a direct 
connection for 45 out of the 168 cases with majority ownership (40%). 50 with no 
single group having majority, and 73 with another group having the majority. For 
1997 it is 65 out of 157 (42%). 23 with no single group having majority, and 69 
with another group having the majority.  
 
In 1997 the correspondence is strongest for foreign and employee ownership with 
correspondence in more than 50% of the cases. For state ownership there is no 
cases of majority of public representatives in 1997. In most cases when the majority 
owner does not have majority in the board instead insiders dominate the board. 
Other employees are surprisingly strongly represented in the boards with a majority 
in 30% of the enterprises in 1997, although they only have a direct majority of 
ownership in 13% of the 162 included in the table. We assume that many of the 
employees in the boards are specialists, with positions quite close to management. 
This assumption is supported by the results on the influence of different groups, see 
below. 
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Table Q2.2-95    Board majority on ownership majority 1995 - seats > 1   
            \ ownership 1995 
majority board 1995 
 
state  
 
for-
eign 
 
dom. 
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
state/municipal 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0  
foreign 4 8 0 0 0 0 12 4 7 0  
domestic external owner 5 0 14 5 1 0 25 7 11 5  
managers 3 2 7 7 7 3 29 9 9 8  
other employees 7 2 14 15 15 1 54 24 21 6  
no majority 10 15 16 4 7 1 51 16 20 13  
total 30 27 51 32 30 5 173 61 69 32 
 
Table Q2.2-97    Board majority on ownership majority 1997 - seats > 1   
        \majority ownership 
majority board 1997 
 
state  
 
for-
eign 
 
domes
-tic 
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
state/municipal 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0  
foreign 1 17 0 1 0 0 19 5 12 0  
domestic external owner 2 2 22 5 1 2 34 8 12 11  
managers 1 4 7 15 7 3 37 14 13 7  
other employees 1 0 19 17 11 0 49 18 19 9  
no majority 1 10 9 1 2 0 23 17 7 4  
total  6 33 57 40 21 5 162 62 64 31 
 ** check other employees majority in the board  
 
The managers were asked to estimate the influence of different groups on a scale 
from 1 = some influence to 3 low or no influence. From the table below it can be 
seen that there are no significant differences between the results for 1995 and 1997. 
 
In general managers are considered to have the highest influence on decisions. The 
lowest influence for managers is on the selection of managers. Here has the relevant 
owner group the same level except for state ownership (quite the same as in Latvia). 
When they are owners managers have slightly more influence concerning strategic 
decisions like Along term plans@ and Anew technology@. Other employees are not 
considered to have more influence because of employee ownership. In general they 
are rated second for all cases, but they are far from the influence level of managers. 
The highest rating for employee influence in 1997 is for safety and health. 
 
Domestic private external owners do not seem to have much influence. Foreign 
owners are considered to have some influence especially on strategic questions, but 
they are still rated much lower than the level of managers. State representatives are 
perceived to have very little influence in all groups even in state owned enterprises.  
 
There are no significant differences between the firms when categorized on origin. 
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Table Q.18.1  Different groups influence on decisions on ownership1995 
   \majority ownership 
average of 1 (high) to 3 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
em-
ployee
mana-
ger 
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
1.  long term plans 
managers
 
1.57
 
1.48
 
1.55
 
1.32
 
1.24
 
1.75
 
1,46
 
1.42
 
1.40
 
1.68
other employees 2.54 2.73 2.44 2.26 2.39 2.63 2.47 2.35 2.53 2.42 
domestic priv. ext. own 2.59 2.82 2.50 2.76 2.88 2.63 2.68 2.79 2.65 2.63 
foreign owners         2.68 1.94 2.89 3,00 2.98 2.50 2.73 2.81 2.59 2.92 
state representatives 2.57 2.88 2.94 2.79 2.76 3.00 2.81 2.75 2.84 3.00 
2.  new technology 
managers
 
1 49
 
1 45
 
1 69
 
1 32
 
1 56
 
1 75
 
1 54
 
1 35
 
1 65
 
1 74
other employees 2.27 2.33 2.26 2.18 2.34 2.63 2.29 2.21 2.38 2.29 
domestic priv. ext. own 2,70 2.97 2.82 2.79 2.88 2.63 2.82 2.79 2.81 2.89 
foreign owners         2.68 2.06 2.90 3.00 3.00 2.50 2.75 2.81 2.66 2.92 
state representatives 2.81 2.97 3.00 3.00 2.95 3.00 2.55 2.94 2.95 3.00 
3. manager selection 
managers
 
2.05
 
2.12
 
2.27
 
1.82
 
1.98
 
2.25
 
2.08
 
1.80
 
2.13
 
2.47
other employees  2.59 2.73 2.00 2.61 2.51 2.88 2.52 2.48 2.59 2.42 
domestic priv. ext. own 2.57 2.76 2.34 2.62 2.76 2.50 2.57 2.72 2.53 2.50 
foreign owners          2.70 1.82 3.00 2.94 2.95 2.38 2.72 2.79  2.55  3.00 
state representatives  2.70 2.94 2.97 2.97 3.00 3.00 2.93 2.88 2.95 2.95 
4. employment 
managers
 
1.59
 
1.36
 
1.53
 
1.32
 
1.29
 
1.88
 
1.45
 
1.31
 
1.42
 
1.74
other employees  2.46 2.61 2.26 2.45 2.27 2.75 2.42 2.34 2.53 2.34 
domestic priv. ext. own 2.70 2.82 2.66 2.85 2.88 2.63 2.76 2.91 2.74 2.68 
foreign owners          2.70 2.12 3,00 2.89 3.00 2.63 2.77 2.97 2.66 2.95 
state representatives  2.70 2.94 2.91 3.00 2.90 3.00 2.91 2.83 2.91 2.97 
5. wage-levels 
managers
 
1.46
 
1.48
 
1.40
 
1.32
 
1.24
 
1.63
 
1.39
 
1.36
 
1.37
 
1.55
other employees  2.41 2.58 2.38 2.39 2.34 2.50 2.41 2.28 2.44 2.42 
domestic priv. ext. own 2,65 2.82 2.63 2.76 2.93 2.63 2.74 2.79 2.74 2.68 
foreign owners         2.81 2.09 2,97 2.98 3.00 2.63 2.80 2.99 2.69 3.00 
state representatives  2.84 2.88 3.00 2.90 2.98 3.00 2.92 2.90 2.90 2.97 
6. safety and health 
managers
 
1.51
 
1.39
 
1.58
 
1.41
 
1.66
 
1.63
 
1.53
 
1.47
 
1.52
 
1.79
other employees  2.97 2.15 2.09 2.16 1.98 2.25 2.13 2.11 2.17 2.11 
domestic priv. ext.own 2.89 2.94 2.87 2.88 2.98 2.75 2.90 2.99 2.88 2.89 
foreign owners          2.86 2.70 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.75 2.92 2.93 2.90 3.00 
state representatives  2.57 2.64 2.68 2.71 2.66 2.63 2.66 2.71 2.66 2.71 
 N 37 33 34 62 41 8 215 75 86 38 
1=high, 2=some, and 3 = low or no influence , missing = 3 if some of the category has been answered 
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Table Q.18.2  Different groups influence on decisions on ownership1997  
   \majority ownership 
average of 1 (high) to 3 
 
state  
 
foreign
 
domes-
tic 
 
em-
ployee
mana-
ger 
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
1.  long term plans 
managers  
 
2.11 
 
1.27 
 
1.33 
 
1.65 
 
1.12 
 
1.75 
 
1.34 
 
1.31 
 
1.29 
 
1.44  
other employees  2.44 2.62 2.46 2.43 2.35 2.50 2.46 2.27 2.56 2.41  
domestic priv. ext. own 2.11 2.70 2.43 2.81 2.75 2.63 2.62 2.89 2.60 2.49  
foreign owners          2.56 2.00 3,00 2.88 2.96 2.75 2.74 2.91 2.61 2.92  
state representatives  2.67 2.95 2.73 2.94 2.77 2.88 2.85 2.83 2.86 2.97  
2.  new technology 
managers  
 
2.00 
 
1.32 
 
1.49 
 
1.50 
 
1.35 
 
1.88 
 
1.47 
 
1.27 
     
1.61 
     
1.59  
other employees  2.44 2.27 2.31 2.22 2.27 2.75 2.29 2.34 2.36 2.21  
domestic priv. ext. own 2.56 2.89 2.67 2.92 2.77 2.50 2.76 2.77 2.79 2.74  
foreign owners          2.56 2.11 2,96 2.94 2.96 2.75 2.77 2.84 2.67 2.92  
state representatives  3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.96 3.00 2.99 2.99 2.98 3.00  
3.  manager selection  
managers  
 
1.89 
1.05**
2.05?
 
2.14 
 
2.46 
 
1.83 
 
2.38 
 
2.08 
 
1.91 
 
2.14 
 
2.36  
other employees  2.67 2.78 1.96 2.51 2.48 3.00 2.51 2.39 2.60 2.38  
domestic priv. ext. own 2.33 2.68 2.22 2.73 2.62 2.13 2.49 2.71 2.55 2.26  
foreign owners          2.67 1.81 3,00 2.94 2.90 2.63 2.71 2.88 2.48 3.00  
state representatives  3.00 2.87 2.96 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.91 3.00 2.99 3.00  
4. employment 
managers  
 
1.44 
 
1.16 
 
1.36 
 
1.54 
 
1.33 
 
1.63 
 
1.35 
 
1.30 
 
1.34 
 
1.54  
other employees  2.33 2.57 2.35 2.30 2.38 2.63 2.39 2.29 2.49 2.38  
domestic priv. ext. own 2.33 2.78 2.59 2.92 2.67 2.63 2.69 2.81 2.71 2.56  
foreign owners          2.89 2.16 3,00 2.90 2.92 2.88 2.79 2.96 2.66 2.92  
state representatives  2.78 2.97 2,92 2.96 2.87 3.00 2.92 2,79 2.93 2.97  
5. wage-levels 
managers  
 
1.44 
 
1.30 
 
1.29 
 
1.42 
 
1.12 
 
1.50 
 
1.29 
 
1.34 
 
1.31 
 
1.46  
other employees  2.44 2.51 2.22 2.33 2.37 2.50 2.37 2.22 2.44 2.28  
domestic priv. ext. own 2.44 2.76 2.55 2.88 2.75 2.38 2.68 2.83 2.68 2.62  
foreign owners          2.89 2.19 3,00 2.96 2.92 2.88 2.81 2.95 2.65 3.00  
state representatives  2.89 2.95 3.00 2.96 2.98 3.00 2.95 2.99 2.94 3.00  
6. safety and health 
managers  
 
1.22 
 
1.32 
 
1.38 
 
1.62 
 
1.44 
 
1.50 
 
1.42 
 
1.37 
 
1.44 
 
1.59  
other employees  1.33**? 2.08 2.15 2.13 2.92 2.25 2.09 2.11 2.14 2.03  
domestic priv. ext. own 3.00 2.86 2.86 2.88 2.77 2.88 2.85 2.78 2.87 2.85  
foreign owners          3.00 2.62 3.00 2.99 2.96 3.00 2.92 2.96 2.86 3.00  
state representatives  2.33 2.59 2.73 2.58 2.67 2.38 2.60 2.99 2.66 2.64  
 N 9 37 26 69 52 8 201 70 85 39 
1=high, 2=some, and 3 = low or no influence, missing = 3 if some of the category has been answered 
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Table Q.16   Percent membership of unions - on ownership  
\majority ownership 
union membership 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
average % 1995 
N
44 
34
5 
30
15
56
1 
42
20 
31
1 
8
16 
201
33 
64
1 
81
11
35 
 1996 
   N 
15 
11 
5 
30
26 
69
14
47
7 
36
0 
7
15 
202 
32 
64 
1 
81
6
36 
 1997 
   N 
**95 
8 
6 
34
  22 
64
2 
53
5 
24
4 
8
13 
200 
35 
64 
1 
81
5 
37
0%  1995 24 
(75)
26 
(87)
43 
(83)
39 
(93)
24 
(83)
7 
(88)
163 
(84)
49 
(76)
76 
(94)
29 
(83)
]0-100%[ 1995 
  
8 
(25) 
3 
(10) 
8 
(15)
3 
(7)
5 
(17)
1 
(12)
28 
(15)
14 
(22) 
5 
(6)
5 
(14)
100% 1995 
    
0 
(0) 
1 
(3) 
1 
(2)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
2 
(1)
1 
(1) 
0 
(0)
1 
(3)
0%  1997 5 
(71)
29 
(85)
50 
(82)
48 
(91)
20 
(83)
7 
(88)
169 
(96)
49 
(76)
78 
(96)
29 
(78)
]0-100%[ 1997 
  
2 
(29) 
4 
(12) 
10 
(16)
5 
(9)
4 
(17)
1 
(12)
26 
(13)
13 
(21) 
3 
(4)
8 
(22)
100% 1997 
    
0 
(0) 
1 
(3) 
1 
(2)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
2 
(1)
2 
(3) 
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
**check state owned for 1996 
 
 Table Q.17  Procedures for employee influence - 1997  
       \majority ownership 
 
state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
no other procedures  
      (than through unions)  
1 
(11) 
6 
(16) 
15 
(21) 
8 
(15) 
3 
(12) 
0 
(0) 
33 
(16) 
10 
(13) 
13 
(16) 
10 
(25) 
yes, other procedures 8 
(89) 
31 
(84) 
58 
(79) 
45 
(85) 
22 
(86) 
9 
(100)
173 
(84) 
65 
(87) 
72 
(85) 
29 
(75) 
 
importance for influence  
trade unions                     1 
                                     2-3 
                   not relevant  4 
                                       N 
                   average         
 
2 
1 
6 
9 
3,22 
2
2
33
37
3,76
8
5
55
68
3,54
4
1
48
53
3,75
0
5
20
25
3,68
1
0
7
8
3,63
 
17 
14 
169 
200 
3,64 
 
10 
9 
51 
70 
3,39 
3
0
82
85
3,89
3
4
31
38
3,61
employees as                  1 
shareholders                2-3 
                   not relevant  4 
                                       N 
                   average         
0 
3 
6 
9 
3,33 
4
2
31
37
3,59
20
10
38
68
2,91
20
7
26
53
2,68
20
2
3
25
1,48
1
0
7
8
3,63
65 
24 
112 
201 
2,85 
20 
13 
37 
70 
2,81 
24
8
53
85
3,04
19
4
15
38
2,32
other structure                 1 
                                     2-3 
                   not relevant  4 
                                       N 
                   average         
0 
0 
9 
9 
4,00 
3
3
31
37
3,59
10
4
54
68
3,46
5
3
45
53
3,62
0
2
23
25
3,92
0
0
8
8
4,00
18 
12 
170 
200 
3,62 
5 
3 
62 
70 
3,67 
7
6
72
85
3,64
7
2
29
38
3,37
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Missing values included as “not relevant” (4) if there are other response for that firm that year. 
 
 
Union membership is in general very low and slightly falling over time. The 
membership level is significantly higher for state owned enterprises. Employee 
owned enterprises have surprisingly low union membership. There are no unions in 
nearly all the new enterprises. 
 
Not surprisingly the unions do not play an important role for any of the owner 
groups. In companies with employee-shares, ownership is considered to be an 
important channel for employee influence. Not surprisingly this is the case for 
nearly all the responses for majority employee owned enterprises. However, it is 
worth noting that also in quite many of the majority management owned and in the 
externally domestic owned enterprises, shareholding is perceived as an important 
channel for employee influence.   
 
6.  Compensation system 
Table Q3.1 Manager compensation depending on company results 
frequency   (percentage)     1995     1996     1997 
A.  depend on results   48  (22)   58  (26)   61  (27) 
      N 220 (100) 220 (100) 220 (100) 
B. depending on profit   21  (31)   26  (33)   29  (35)  
     depending on sales   14  (21)   16  (20)   19  (23) 
     other   32  (48)   37  (47)   35  (42) 
     N   67 (100)   79 (100)   83 (100) 
C. 0%            of total pay  155  (70)  143  (65)  140  (63) 
     0-49%   of total pay    26  (12)    33  (15)    34  (15) 
     50-99% of total pay    15   (7)    16   (7)    17   (8) 
     100% of total pay      4   (2)      5   (2)      6   (3) 
      N    20   (9)    23  (11)    23  (11) 
 
There is a slight tendency for an increase over time in result-dependent 
compensation. This is both the case for profit-related and sales-related 
compensation schemes. However, most of the enterprises do not have such schemes 
– it covers 0% of the manager pay in around 65% of the enterprises. In this respect 
it is on the same level as in Latvia. 
 
Result related compensation is slightly more frequent in foreign and domestic 
externally owned enterprises than in the remaining groups, but the differences 
between ownership groups are not so significant. Unlike Latvia there are only quite 
few enterprises, which have 100% of total pay to top managers being dependent on 
results. Cooperatives use typically other results than profits such as sales, or input 
prices as base for the remuneration. 
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Table Q.3.2  Manager compensation depending on results - ownership 1997 
               \ownership 
frequency     (%) 
state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no 
maj. 
no an-
swer 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
A. depend on results 2 
(22) 
12 
(31) 
25 
(34) 
14 
(26) 
6 
(22) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(22) 
61 
(28) 
24 
(32) 
22 
(24) 
11 
(28) 
      N 9 
(100) 
38 
(100) 
74 
(100)
54 
(100)
27 
(100)
9 
(100)
9 
(100)
220 
(100) 
75 
(100) 
91 
(100)
40 
(100)
B. depending on profit 1 
(33) 
6 
(35) 
11 
(37) 
7 
(39) 
4 
(40) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
29 
(35) 
11 
(34) 
13 
(42) 
2 
(12) 
     depending on sales 0 
(0) 
4 
(23) 
6 
(20) 
5 
(28) 
3 
(30) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(50) 
19 
(23) 
9 
(28) 
5 
(16) 
5 
(29) 
     other 2 
(67) 
7 
(42) 
13 
(43) 
6 
(33) 
3 
(30) 
3 
(100)
1 
(50) 
35 
(42) 
12 
(38) 
13 
(42) 
10 
(59) 
     N 3 
(100) 
17 
(100) 
30 
(100)
18 
(100)
10 
(100)
3 
(100)
2 
(100)
83 
(100) 
32 
(100) 
31 
(100)
17 
(100)
C. 0%      of total pay 7 
(78) 
21 
(55) 
45 
(61) 
37 
(69) 
16 
(59) 
7 
(78) 
7 
(78) 
140 
(64) 
61 
(70) 
43 
(57) 
22 
(55) 
    0-24% of total pay 1 
(11) 
7 
(18) 
13 
(18) 
7 
(13) 
6 
(22) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
34 
(15) 
11 
(13) 
15 
(20) 
5 
(13) 
    25-49% of total pay 1 
(11) 
2 
(5) 
7 
(9) 
3 
(5) 
2 
(7) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(22) 
17 
(8) 
2 
(2) 
11 
(15) 
3 
(7) 
  50-99% of total pay 0 
(0) 
3 
(8) 
3 
(4) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(3) 
4 
(5) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(5) 
     100% of total pay 0 
(0) 
5 
(14) 
6 
(8) 
7 
(13) 
3 
(11) 
2 
(22) 
0 
(0) 
23 
(10) 
9 
(10) 
6 
(8) 
8 
(20) 
      N 9 
(100) 
38 
(100) 
74 
(100)
54 
(100)
27 
(100)
9 
(100)
9 
(100)
220 
(100) 
75 
(100) 
75 
(100)
40 
(100)
 
Table Q5  Average monthly salary - over time 
 
mean           standard deviation 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
topmanager - EEK  
N 
 
7211        8273  
        189 
 
9160       10652 
         198 
 
10370     13301 
          194 
 
all employees - EEK 
N 
 
 2862       3213 
          197 
 
 2885        2069 
         206 
 
 3559        2529 
          203 
 
the lowest paid employee  
N 
 
1226        1388 
          186 
 
  1337       1051 
         195 
 
 1456        1022 
          195 
 
topmanager/all employees 
 
2.80          3.64 
 
3.17           2.16 
 
2.92           2.88 
 
all employees/lowest paid 
 
2.99          3.56 
 
2.15           1.46 
 
2.82           1.90 
average wage for Estonia (ESA) 2375 2985 3573 
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Table Q.5-96   Average monthly salary on ownership - 1997  
    \majority ownership 
                  EEK 
 
state  
 
foreign
 
domes-
tic 
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
topmanager - mean  
standard deviation 
N 
 
7187 
6834 
  8 
15462
18525
   35
9744
9864
  66
  9984
15903
  52
4477
3314
  25
6670
4802
  8
 
10370 
13301 
  194 
 
10526 
14238 
  68 
 9975
14370
   82
 8686
8454
   37
 
all employees, mean 
standard deviation 
N 
 
 2840 
 1951 
    9 
  5373
  3099
    36
 3271
 2924
  70
  3277
  1721
   53
2451
1260
  23
2635
1442
   8
 
 3559 
 2529 
 203 
 
2987 
2875 
  70 
 2785
 2915
 85
 1715
 1233
 39
 
lowest paid employee  
standard deviation 
N 
 
 1049 
   719 
   9 
 2153
 1721
   36
 1179
  609
  70
 1441
  985
  53
  734
  684
   25
 795
 1051
    8
 
 1456 
1022 
 195 
 
 1368 
  604 
  70 
 1549 
 1458
   85
 897
 707
   39
 
topmanager/employees 
standard deviation 
 
3,00 
1,04 
2,76
1,32
3,23
2,57
3,09
4,43
1,88 
 0,57
2,78
1,99
 
2,92 
2,88 
 
3,18 
4,52 
2,65
2,12
3,15
2,12
 
average/lowest paid 
standard deviation 
 
3,06 
1,48 
2,61
1,46
3,06
2,87
2,62
1,22
2,92
1,38
2,74
0,90
 
2,82 
1,90 
 
2,70 
1,06 
2,64
1,37
2,69
1,06
 
The pay for the lowest employee is very low even for Estonian standards, but 
although we asked about full time wage, the responses may cover part time 
employees. The average monthly salary has increased by 25% from 1995 to 1997. 
For managers the increase has been stronger. Both managers and other employees 
have a significant higher salary in foreign owned enterprises than in other types. 
Employee owned enterprises and no majority enterprises are found in the other end 
of the scale. State owned enterprises are also below the average. The average wage 
for all employees and for the lowest paid employee is higher in new than in 
privatized companies. However, the lowest level is found in the cooperatives, 
probably because of quite low levels of pay in agricultural related production. 
  
Table Q6-7-8   Form of payment for employees - over time 
frequency     (percentage)     1995     1996     1997 
hourly time rate   45    (22)    49    (23)  51     (24) 
weekly/monthly time rate   67    (33)   68    (32)  63     (30) 
piece rate   73    (36)   72    (34)  71     (34) 
other   20    (10)   25    (12)  25     (12) 
N 205  (100) 214  (100) 210  (100) 
profit sharing 
N 
  13      (7) 
198  (100) 
  14      (7) 
206  (100) 
  13      (6)  
204  (100) 
monetary incentive scheme 
N 
106    (54) 
196  (100) 
112    (55) 
205  (100) 
108    (53) 
204  (100) 
non-monetary benefits 
N 
   24   (12) 
 206  (100) 
  25    (12)  
206  (100) 
  22    (11) 
202  (100) 
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Table Q6-7-8.2   Forms of payment for employees - on ownership - 1997  
 \majority 
ownership 
 
state 
 
fo-
reign 
 
domes
-tic 
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no 
major.
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
hourly time rate 2 
(22) 
7 
(19) 
16 
(23) 
16 
(30) 
7 
(28) 
3 
(38) 
51 
(25) 
17 
(24) 
21 
(25) 
11 
(28) 
weekly/monthly rate 2 
(22) 
21 
(57) 
15 
(22) 
14 
(27) 
6 
(24) 
3 
(38) 
61 
(30) 
14 
(20) 
34 
(40) 
7 
(18) 
piece rate 2 
(22) 
4 
(10) 
31 
(45) 
16 
(30) 
11 
(44) 
2 
(25) 
66 
(34) 
28 
(40) 
23 
(27) 
16 
(41) 
other 3 
(34) 
5 
(13) 
7 
(10) 
7 
(13) 
1 
(4) 
0 
(0) 
23 
(11) 
11 
(16) 
7 
(8) 
5 
(13) 
                             N 9 37 69 53 25 8 201 70 85 39 
profit sharing 
                             N 
   1 
   9 
   2
 35
   4
 69
   3
 51
  2 
  24
   0
   8
  13
 204
   2 
 66 
   6 
 83 
   4
 39
monetary incentive 
scheme                 N 
   3 
   9 
  26
  35
 36
 69
 21
 50
 14
 25
   4
   7
 108
 203
 42 
 69 
 39 
 80 
 20
 38
non-monetary 
benefits                 N 
   0 
   9 
   8
  36
 10
 64
 2
 52
 0
 25
   0
   9
 20
 202
 6 
 67 
 12 
 82 
 4
 37
 
The difference between the managers’ salary and other employees are lowest in 
employee owned enterprises. The relatively high proportion between management 
pay and the pay for other employees in state owned enterprises and domestic 
externally owned enterprises might partly be explained by their relatively large size. 
However, foreign owned enterprises were also quite large on average, but they have 
salary differentials below the average. Management owned enterprises have a quite 
high salary level for managers and high differentials in relation to other employees. 
Unlike in Latvia it seems that managers take out part of their ownership 
remuneration in the form of salaries. 
 
The forms of payment for employees are quite stable over time. Piece rate payment 
is used in around one third of the cases. Profit sharing is not common, but other 
forms of monetary incentive schemes are used in more than fifty percent of the 
cases. Piece rates are used less frequently in state owned and no majority owned 
enterprises. Profit sharing is used only in a few cases, while monetary incentive 
schemes are especially frequent found in the foreign owned enterprises. 
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8.  Restructuring 
The frequency of change is increasing over time. Most frequent is change on the 
number of department covering 45 of the enterprises over three years. Change in 
hierarchical levels and splitting out some units or including new units have each 
around half the frequency. Changing the number of departments is especially 
frequent in externally owned enterprises (state, foreign and externally domestic). 
Employee owned enterprises are reluctant to these type restructuring. While the 
state owned enterprises are surprisingly active, except for including new units, 
restructuring in the state enterprises are as high as for foreign ownership or for 
domestic external ownership. New enterprises are a bit more active in 
organizational changes than privatized entities. This is surprising because new 
enterprises start up with a brand new organization. On the other hand small fast 
growing new enterprises need many organizational changes in their early 
development stage. 
 
Table Q4.1   Restructuring of organizational structure - over time 
frequency     (percentage)     1995     1996     1997 1995-97* 
changed no. of departments 
N 
  56    (28) 
199  
  57    (27) 
210  
  63     (30) 
207  
  99    (45) 
220 
changed hierachical level 
N 
  31    (16) 
199  
  31    (19) 
210  
  40     (19) 
206  
   64   (29) 
 220 
sold/closed part of company 
N 
  29    (15) 
199  
  28    (13) 
208  
  34     (16) 
208  
   59   (27) 
 220 
included new units 
N 
  26    (15) 
171  
  26    (13) 
208  
  29     (14) 
  205  
   51   (23) 
 220 
some organizational change 
N 
 101   (55) 
 183 
 112   (58) 
 193 
 126    (65) 
 192 
 139   (65) 
 211 
* At least one change in the period. Enterprises with several changes count only for one change 
Table Q4.2  Restructuring of organization 1995-97 - on ownership 1997  
\majority ownership state  for-
eign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
changed the number  
of departments 
N 
5 
(55) 
9 
20 
(53) 
38 
39 
(53) 
74 
21 
(39) 
54 
3 
(10) 
27 
6 
(11) 
9 
90 
(43) 
211 
38 
(40) 
75 
35 
(53) 
91 
15 
(53) 
40 
changed                  
hierarchical level 
N 
5 
(55) 
9 
13 
(34) 
38 
25 
(34) 
74 
10 
(19) 
54 
4 
(11) 
27 
3 
(33) 
9 
60 
(28) 
211 
31 
(21) 
75 
18 
(33) 
91 
12 
(33) 
40 
sold/closed part of firm 
 
N 
2 
(22) 
9 
10 
(27) 
38 
28 
(38) 
74 
11 
(20) 
54 
2 
(7) 
27 
3 
(33) 
9 
56 
(27) 
211 
19 
(23) 
75 
20 
(27) 
91 
13 
(27) 
40 
included new units 
 
N 
1 
(11) 
9 
8 
(21) 
38 
21 
(28) 
74 
16 
(30) 
54 
1 
(4) 
27 
3 
(33) 
9 
50 
(24) 
211 
19 
(26) 
75 
23 
(25) 
91 
5 
(25) 
40 
some organizational 
change 
8   
(88) 
29 
(76) 
57 
(77) 
29 
(53) 
10 
(37) 
6 
(66) 
139 
(65) 
59 
(78) 
47 
(51) 
27 
(68) 
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N 9 38 74 54 27 9 211 75 91 40 
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Table Q9.1 Importance of investment finance - on ownership - 1995 
  \majority ownership 
frequency:1 high 8 low 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
savings inside 
company             
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
10   26 
  9   24 
  0     0 
19   50 
38 100 
15   45
11   33
 2     6
 5   15
33 100
29   45
11   17
  0     0
24   38
64 100
16   38
12   29
  0     0
14   33
42 100
17   49
11   31
  0     0
  7   20
35 100
 4   50
 0     0
0     0 
  4   50
10 100
91  41 
54    5 
  2    1 
73  33 
22010
0 
29   39 
20   27 
  1     1 
25   33 
75 100 
35   40
24   28
 1     1
27   31
87 100
21   48
5   17
  0     0
14   35
40 100
extra capital          
from the owners 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  4   11 
  5   13 
  0     0 
29   76 
38 100 
11   33
12   36
  0     0
10   31
33 100
  7   11
14   22
  1     1
42   66
64 100
  5   12
16   38
  1     2
20   48
42 100
  8   23
15   43
  0     0
12   34
35 100
0      0
 3    38
 0      0
5    62
 8  100
35  16 
65  30 
  2    1 
118 
53 
22010
0 
12   16 
24   32 
  0     0 
39   52 
75 100 
15   17
33   38
2     2
37   43
87 100
4   10
7   17
0     2
29   73
40 100
allocation by         
the government 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  0     0 
  3     8 
  2     5 
33   87 
38 100 
0     0
1     3
1     3
31   94
33 100
  0     0
  0     0
  1     2
63   98
64 100
  2     5
  0     0
  1     2
39   95
42 100
 0     0
 1     3
 1     3
33   94
35 100
 0      0
 0      0
 1    12
 7    88
 8  100
   2    1 
   5    2 
   7    3 
206 
94 
22010
0 
  0     0 
  4     5 
  2     3 
69   92 
75 100 
 2     2
 0     0
 4     4
81   94
87 100
  0     0
 1     2 
  0     4
39   98
40 100
loans from banks  
/investment funds 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
 4   11 
 7     8 
 1     3 
26   68 
38 100 
 3     9
 4   12
 1     3
25   76 
33 100
11   17
10   16
  2     3
41   64
64 100
11   26
  6   14
  0     0
25   60
42 100
  5   15
  9   25
  1     3
20   57
35 100
 0      0
 1    12
 1    12
 6    76
 8  100
 34  15 
 37  16 
   6    3 
143 
66 
22010
0 
13   17 
21   28 
  2     3 
39   52 
75 100 
16   18
  8     9
  3     3
60   70
87 100
  4   10
  5   13
  1     2
30   75
40 100
domestic               
private capital 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
 3     9 
 0     0 
 1     3 
34   88 
38 100 
 0     0
 3     9
 1     3
29   88
33 100
 2     3
 4     6
 0     0
58   91
64 100
 0     0
 2     4
 1     2
39   94
42 100
  1     3
  1     3
  1     3
32   91
35 100
 0      0
 1    12
 1    12
 6    76
 8  100
   6 
3 
 11 
6 
   5 
2 
198 
89 
22010
0 
  1     2 
  4     5 
  2     2 
68   91 
75 100 
3     3
 6     6
 2     2
76   89
87 100
  0     0
  1     2
  0     0
39   98
40 100
foreign private 
capital 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  0     0 
  0     0 
  3     9 
35   91 
38 100 
  3     9
  2     6
  2     6
26   79
33 100
  0     0
  1     2
  0     0
63   98
64 100
  1     2
  0     0
  1     2
40   96
42 100
  0     0
  0     0
  1     3
34   97
35 100
 1    12
 0      0
 1    12
 6    76
 8  100
  5    2 
  3    1 
  8    3 
204 
94 
22010
0 
  0     0 
  0     0 
  4     5 
71   95 
75 100 
  5     5
  3     3
  3     3
76   89
87 100
  0     0
  0     0
  0     0
40 100
40 100
investment by       
other 
establishments 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
  1     3 
  1     3 
  3     9 
  0     0
  0     0
  3     6
  1     2
  3     6
  1     2
  0     0
  2     4
  3     6
  0     0
  1     3
  1     3
 0      0
 1    12
 1    12
  2    1 
  7    3 
12    5 
  1    2 
  1    2 
  5    5 
  0     0
  2     2
  5     5
  1     2
  3     7
  1     2
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establishments 8 
N 
33   85 
38 100 
30   94
33 100
59   90
64 100
37   90
42 100
33   94
35 100
 6    76
 8  100
199 
91 
22010
0 
68  91 
75 100 
80   93
87 100
35   89
40 100
average     same N as above 
savings inside company 4.30 2.59 3.73 3.64 2.48 4.00 3.44 3.34 3.57 3.11 
extra capital from owners 6.30 3.41 5.82 5.07 3.67 5.43 5.02 5.27 4.55 6.08 
government allocation  7.21 7.78 7.97 7.57 7.70 7.43 7.68 7.52 7.68 7.83 
loans from banks       5.88 6.55 5.74 5.31 5.30 6.71 5.77 5.21 6.06 6.39 
domestic private capital 7.24 7.47 7.39 7.62 7.52 6.57 7.42 7.46 7.26 7.83 
foreign private capital 7.64 6.78 7.90 7.74 7.88 6.43 7.60 7.78 7.26 8.00 
investment by other units 7.24 7.81 7.63 7.45 7.73 7.43 7.57 7.68 7.64 7.36
Missing values included as Anot used@ (weight 8) if there are other responses for that enterprise that year. 
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Table Q9.2 Importance of investment finance - on ownership - 1997 
   \majority ownership 
frequency: 1 high 8 low 
state foreign dom. mana- 
ger 
em-
ployee
no 
maj. 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
savings inside 
company             
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  2   22 
  7   78 
  0     0 
  0     0 
  9 100 
19   50
14   35
  1     3
  4   12
38 100
34   46 
26   35
  1     1
13   18
74 100
30   56
15   27
  1     2
  8   15
54 100
22   81
  2     7
  0     0
  3   12
27 100
 3   22
 3   34
 0     0
 4   44
 9 100
114  52 
70  32 
   3    1 
33  15 
220100 
42   55 
29   39 
  2     3 
  2     3 
75 100 
41   47
25   29
  1     1
20   23
87 100
22   55
10   25
  0     0
  8   30
40 100
extra capital          
from the owners 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  4   44 
  2   22 
  2   22 
  1   12 
  9 100 
 9   24
12   32
 0     0
17   44
38 100
  8     1
27   36
  3     4
36   49
74 100
  7   13
25   46
  0     0
22   41
54 100
  0     0
12   44
  1     4
14   52
27 100
 2   22
 4   44
 0     0
 3   34
9 100 
 31  14 
 86  39 
   6    3 
97  44 
220100 
10   13 
35   47 
  3     4 
27   36 
75 100 
12   14
34   39
  2     2
39   45
87 100
  5   12
11   28
  0     0
24   60
40 100
allocation by         
the government 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  0     0 
  0     0 
  0     0 
  9 100 
  9 100 
  0     0
  0     0
  1     3
37   97
38 100
  0     0
  0     0
  2     3
72   97
74 100
  0     0
  1     1
  3     6
50   93
54 100
  0     0
  0     0
  2     7
25   93
27 100
 0     0
 0     0
 0     0
 9 100
 9 100
   0     0 
   2     1 
   9     4 
209  95 
220100 
 0     0 
 1     1 
 3     4 
71   95 
75 100 
  0     0
  0     0
  4     5
83   95 
87 100
  0     0
  1     2
  1     2
38   96 
40 100
loans from banks  
and investment 
funds 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  2   22 
  1   12 
  0     0 
  6   66 
  9 100 
  5   13
10   26
  0     0
23   61
38 100
20   27
24   32
  2     3
28   38
74 100
12   22
14   26
  2     4
16   48
54 100
  2     7
  6   22
  2     7
17   64
27 100
 3   33
 1   12
 0     0
 5   55
 9 100
 45  20 
 58  26 
   7    4 
109  50 
220100 
18   24 
29   39 
  3     4 
25   33 
75 100 
19   22
11   13
  3     3
54   62
87 100
  8   20
  9   23
  1     2
22   55
40 100
 
domestic               
private capital 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  0     0 
  2   22 
  2   22 
  5   55 
  9 100 
  0     0
  1     3
  3     8
34   89
38 100
  5     7
  7     9
  5     7
57   77
74 100 
  0     0
  4     7
  3     6
47   87
54 100
  1     4
  2     8
  1     4
23   84
27 100
 0     0
 1   12
 0     0
 8   88
 9 100
   7     3 
 18     8 
   4     2 
191  87 
220100 
  2     2 
  5     6 
  8   12 
60   80 
75 100 
  3     3
  9   10
  3     3
72   84
87 100
  0     0
  2     3
  2     3
36   90
40 100
foreign private      
capital 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  1   12 
  3   33 
  0     0 
  5   55 
9 100 
  4   11
  2     6
  1     3
31   80
38 100
 0     0
  2     3
 1     1 
71   96
74 100
  1     2
  1     2
  4     7
48   89
54 100
 0     0 
  1     4
  2     7
24   89
27 100
 0     0
 0     0
 1   12
 8   88
 9 100
  6    3 
  9    4 
10    5 
195  88 
220100 
  2     2 
  4     5 
  3     4 
66   89 
75 100 
  4     5
  5     6
  5     6
73   83
87 100
  0     0
  0     0
  1     2
39   98
40 100
investment by       
other 
establishments 
1 
2-3 
4-7 
8 
N 
  0     0 
  0     0 
  2   22 
 9   78 
9 100 
  1     3
  0     0
  3     9
34   38
38 100
  0     0
  5     7
  4     5
65   88
74 100
  0     0
  4     7
  5     9
45   84
54 100
  0     0
  0     0
  2     7
25   93
27 100
 0     0
0     0
 0     0
9 100
 9 100
   1    2 
   9    4 
 18    8 
192  86 
220100 
 0     0 
 4     5 
5     7 
66   89 
76 100 
  0     0
  2     2
  6     7
79   91
87 100
  0     0
  3     8
  5   12
32   80
40 100
average importance    same N as above       
savings inside company 2.00 2.29 2.70 2.50 1.65 4.25 2.43 1.58 3.00 3.47
extra capital from owners 3.00 4.50 4.99 4.43 5.38 3.50 4.67 4.32 4.63 5.45
allocation by government 8.00 7.92 7.96 7.67 7.81 8.00 7.82 7.79 7.84 7.81
loans from banks       7.11 5.49 4.12 4.81 5.77 4.63 4.93 4.11 5.78 5.05
domestic private capital 5.78 7.66 6.77 7.38 7.15 7.25 7.09 6.93 7.05 7.50
foreign private capital 5.56 6.87 7.82 7.48 7.50 7.50 7.41 7.43 7.13 7.95
investment by other units 7.33 7.57 7.42 7.22 7.77 8.00 7.46 7.42 7.59 7.16
Missing values included as Anot used@ (weight 8) if there are other responses for that enterprise that year.  
Table Q9.1 on sources of finance, show a surprising tendency over since internal 
 
 25 
savings is more important in 1997 than in 1995. However, external financing 
through banks has also increased somewhat in importance. The only financing 
factor going down is “allocation through the government”. 1997 was a booming 
year in Estonia with steep growth in investment. This can explain why some 
sources go up in importance without similar fall in other factors. For inside 
financing there is a steep fall from 73 to 33 in the number of cases with the 
lowest priority or “not relevant” (8). For financing through bank loans the 
number of 8’s fall from 143 (66%) in 1995 to 109 in 1997 (50%).  
 
This tendency over time is pronounced for state owned enterprises. From 1995 to 
1997 the total number of state owned enterprises fall from 9 to 38 and contrary to 
the situation in 1995 none of the remaining get any state allocations in 1997. 
However, it is indicated for state owned enterprises that capital from the owners is 
an important source of finance in 1997. Is this another type of state allocation or is 
it allocations from private minority owners. The importance of foreign capital input 
for four of the state owned enterprises could indicate that the explanation may be 
some form of joint ventures. For the other groups the increase in the importance of 
financing through internal savings is pronounced for employee owned enterprises. 
The percentage of enterprises indicating internal capital as the primary source of 
financing increases from 49% to 81%. The importance of bank loans is falling for 
employee owned and for state owned enterprises, but increasing for other groups. 
 
When you compare the different owner-groups within the specific year it is clear 
that employee owned enterprises are most dependent on internal savings. What is 
more surprising, is the fact that foreign owned enterprises also have a quite high 
dependence on internal savings. You would have expected that extra capital from 
the owners was the main source of financing. This source ranks second for foreign 
owned companies. However, for all companies for both years internal savings are 
the most important source. The only exception is the small group of no-majority 
ownership where capital from the owners has a slightly higher importance 1997. 
 
There is a surprisingly small change over time in the sources of material inputs, see 
table Q10.1 below. Only for domestic sourcing there seems to be some increase 
from 1995 to 1997, and this change can be located to the domestic externally 
owned enterprises. The foreign owned enterprises have the strongest sourcing of 
inputs from Western markets, while employee owned enterprises are found in the 
other end of the specter. Sourcing from Eastern Europe (including CIS) has quite 
low importance for all types of enterprises. 
 
Enterprises with cooperative origin are more based on domestic sources than other 
groups. This is probably caused by agricultural inputs from members of a supplier 
cooperatives. 
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Table Q.10.1  Sources of material inputs on ownership - over time  
       \majority ownership 
importance from 1 to 4 
state  fo-
reign 
domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
from Eastern Europe  1995 3.19 3.52 3.47 3.45 3.33 3.57 3.41 3.22 3.58 3.49 
 1996 3.25 3.44 3.55 3.46 3.27 3.57 3.45 3.23 3.70 3.38 
 1997 2.89 3.54 3.47 3.38 3.52 3.88 3.46 3.28 3.64 3.45 
from West Europe 1995 2.68 1.85 3.00 2.88 2.91 2.71 2.72 2.43 2.77 3.00 
 1996 2.50 1.76 2.78 2.67 3.00 2.43 2.59 2.47 2.62 3.00 
 1997 2.33 1.86 2.85 2.60 3.24 2.25 2.59 2.54 3.64 2.92 
domestic 1995 2.03 2.39 2.20 2.07 1.70 3.57 2.09 1.92 2.22 2.03 
 1996 1.92 2.50 1.64 1.96 2.00 2.86 1.97 1.94 2.14 1.76 
 1997 2.11 2.35 1.68 1.79 1.72 3.00 1.89 1.97 2.02 1.74 
N 1995 37 33 62 42 33 7 214 75 86 37 
 1996 12 34 76 46 37 7 214 75 86 37 
 1997 9 37 68 52 25 8 208 70 84 38 
Missing values included as Anot used@ (weight 4) if there are other response for that enterprise that year. 
  
Table Q.10.2  Sources of material inputs on ownership - 1997  
   \majority ownership 
frequency: 1 (high) to 4 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
mana- 
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
from Eastern 
Europe
  1 2 
(22)
1 
(8)
4 
(6)
5 
(10)
1 
(4)
0 
(0)
13 
(6)
6 
(8)
5 
(6)
1 
(3)
   2 0 
(0) 
4 
(11) 
8 
(12)
4 
(8)
4 
(16)
0 
(0)
21 
(10)
10 
(14) 
3 
(4)
6 
(16)
   3 4 
(45) 
6 
(16) 
8 
(12)
9 
(17)
1 
(4)
1 
(12)
31 
(15)
13 
(19) 
9 
(11)
6 
(16)
               (not used)   4 3 
(33) 
26 
(70) 
48 
(72)
34 
(69)
17 
(76)
7 
(88)
143 
(69)
41 
(59) 
67 
(79)
25 
(65)
from Western 
Europe
  1 4 
(45)
22 
(59)
13 
(19)
10 
(19)
5 
(20)
4 
(50)
61 
(29)
24 
(35)
27 
(32)
5 
(13)
   2 1 
(12) 
6 
(16) 
18 
(26)
20 
(38)
2 
(8)
1 
(12)
51 
(25)
17 
(24) 
20 
(24)
12 
(32)
   3 1 
(12) 
1 
(3) 
3 
(5)
3 
(6)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
8 
(4)
3 
(4) 
2 
(2)
2 
(5)
               (not used)   4 3 
(33) 
8 
(22) 
34 
(50)
19 
(37)
18 
(72)
3 
(38)
88 
(42)
26 
(37) 
35 
(42)
19 
(50)
Domestic   1 3 
(33)
10 
(27)
45 
(65)
33 
(63)
17 
(68)
2 
(25)
116 
(56)
37 
(55)
43 
(51)
27 
(71)
   2 4 
(45) 
14 
(37) 
10 
(15)
6 
(12)
2 
(8)
1 
(12)
39 
(19)
18 
(26) 
17 
(20)
1 
(2)
   3 0 
(0) 
3 
(9) 
3 
(5)
4 
(8)
2 
(8)
0 
(0)
13 
(6)
6 
(8) 
3 
(4)
3 
(7)
               (not used)   4 2 
(22) 
10 
(27) 
10 
(10)
9 
(17)
4 
(16)
5 
(63)
40 
(19)
9 
(13) 
21 
(25)
7 
(19)
N 9 37 68 52 25 8 208 70 84 38
Missing values included as Anot used@ (weight 4) if there are other response for that enterprise that year. 
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Table Q.12 Export as % of turnover to East- and West - on ownership  
  \majority ownership 
export % of turnover 
state  foreign do-
mestic
mana- 
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total privati
zed 
new coop 
to Eastern Europe 1995  8 4 2 3 7 0 4 9 1 5 
 1996 11 5 4 5 4 0 5 8 1 5 
 1997 6 6 7 4 2 1 5 8 2 7 
To the West 1995 20 32 16 14 15 4 18 23 20 6 
 1996 21 33 20 19 13 9 20 28 22 8 
 1997 33 34 21 16 10 4 20 38 22 9 
Total export 1995 28 36 18 17 22 4  23 33 21 11 
 1996 32 38 25 23 17 9 25 36 23 13 
 1997 39 41 28 21 12 5  26 44 24 16 
N 1995 35 33 62 42 35 7 210 68 83 37 
 1996 11 34 75 46 34 7 209 68 83 37 
 1997 9  36 67 50 25 7  203 69 81 38 
Missing values included as 0 export to Eastern Europe, if the firm has responded on exports to Western 
Europe and the other way round. 
 
There is a slight increase in total export over time both for Eastern and Western 
markets. But Western markets are already at this time much more important for the 
enterprises. Employee owned enterprises have falling share of exports both to the 
East and to the West, while domestic externally owned enterprises show a positive 
increase in share of exports on all markets. Privatized enterprises have a higher 
growth in the share of exports than it is the case with new enterprises.  
 
Not surprisingly foreign owned enterprises are on the highest level for Western 
exports, but state counts also high in 1997.  The insider owned enterprises and the 
no majority groups are in the lower end for exports to both markets. Privatized have 
higher exports than new enterprises and coops are clearly lower than other groups. 
 
The average utilization of the workforce (Table Q13A) is increasing over time for 
all groups. Especially the groups of state ownership and no majority are catching up 
so that by 1997 there are no significant differences between the groups. Only 
domestic external ownership and cooperatives are a bit below the other groups. 
 
The average utilization of plant and equipment (Table13B) has varied quite much 
for some of the different owner groups. State owned, employee owned and no 
majority enterprises have increased substantially from 1995 to 1997 while 
management owned enterprises have had a fall in the rate of utilization. 
 
It is surprising that new enterprises record just as low utilization as privatized 
enterprises indicating that they have bought too much capacity from the start. 
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Table Q.13.A  Average utilization of workforce - on ownership  
 \majority ownership 
 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
utilization  
of workforce 
1995 
   N 
76  
38 
90  
33 
80  
64 
85  
42 
80  
35 
75  
8 
82  
220 
87  
70 
90  
84 
82  
38 
 1996 
   N 
87 
12 
90  
35 
86  
77 
86 
 47 
82  
39 
85  
8 
85  
220 
89  
70 
90  
84 
83  
38 
 1997 
   N 
93  
9 
91  
38 
85  
74 
90 
 53 
91 
 27 
94 
 9 
90  
209 
92  
69 
91  
85 
85  
39 
10-25% 1997 0 
(0) 
1 
(3) 
5 
(7) 
2 
(4) 
3 
(11) 
1 
(11) 
12 
(6) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1) 
3 
(7) 
26-50% 1997 0 
(0) 
1 
(3) 
5 
(7) 
4 
(8) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
10 
(5) 
2 
(3) 
6 
(7) 
2 
(5) 
51-75% 1997 1 
(11) 
3 
(8) 
13 
(18) 
3 
(4) 
4 
(15) 
1 
(11) 
25 
(12) 
5 
(7) 
6 
(7) 
11 
(28) 
76-99% 1997  2 
(22) 
4 
(11) 
13 
(18) 
11 
(21) 
6 
(22) 
1 
(11) 
38 
(18) 
18 
(26) 
14 
(17) 
6 
(15) 
100% 1997 6 
(67) 
28 
(74) 
37 
(50) 
33 
(63) 
14 
(52) 
6 
(67) 
124 
(59) 
44 
(64) 
58 
(68) 
17 
(43) 
N 1997 9 
(100) 
38 
(100) 
74 
(100) 
53 
(100) 
27 
(100) 
9 
(100) 
209 
(100)
69 
(100) 
85 
(100) 
39 
(100)
 
Table Q.13.B  Average utilization of plant and equipment - on ownership  
     \majority ownership state  foreign domes
-tic 
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
utilization of plant 
and equipment
1995 
N
64  
30
79 
25
70  
52
81  
33
72  
28
66  
6
74  
174
70  
78
   78  
65
   78  
65
 1996 
   N 
70 
 8 
81  
29
72 
64
73  
35
77  
32
73  
5
73  
173
72  
78 
78 
 65
78 
65
 1997 
   N 
85 
 9 
82** 
38
71 
74
74  
54
80 
27
87  
9
76 
211 
75  
78 
77  
65
77  
65
0% 1997 0 
(0)
8 
(21)
4 
(5)
7 
(13)
1 
(4)
2 
(22)
22 
(8)
16 
(18)
2 
(3)
2 
(5)
1-25% 1997 0 
(0) 
2 
(5)
8 
(11)
4 
(7)
5 
(19)
2 
(22)
21 
(7)
2 
(2) 
5 
(7)
5 
(13)
26-50% 1997 0 
(20 
2 
(5)
11 
(15)
8 
(15)
3 
(11)
0 
(0)
24 
(18)
9  
(11) 
6 
(8)
9 
(23)
51-75% 1997 2 
(22) 
5 
(13)
22 
(30)
9 
(17)
5 
(19)
1 
(12)
44 
(20)
16 
(19) 
24 
(34)
4 
(10)
76-99% 1997 2 
(22) 
12 
(32)
12 
(16)
13 
(24)
7 
(26)
2 
(22)
48 
(22)
24 
(28) 
14 
(20)
8 
(20)
100% 1997 5 
(56) 
9 
(24)
17 
(23)
7 
(13)
6 
(22)
2 
(22)
52 
(25)
19 
(22) 
19 
(27)
12 
(30)
N 1997 9 
(100)
38 
(100)
74 
(100)
54 
(100)
27 
(100)
9 
(100)
211 
(100)
86** 
(100)
70** 
(100)
40 
(100)
** with 21% of firms with 0 utilizationrate how can the end result be 82% for foreign?    **new priv turned around?? 
the part with groups of utilization may be skipped 
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Table Q.14.1 Investment in percent of fixed assets (primo) on ownership   
\majority ownership 
 
 
state  
 
foreign
 
dom. 
 
mana- 
ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
investment 
/fixed assets 
 
1995 
N
 
50 
32
 
22 
31
23 
58
56 
41
90 
27
41 
8
51 
197
 
51 
65
 
36 
82
69 
37 
  1996 
   N 
 
33 
10 
 
35 
32 
52 
69
64 
46
66 
33
15 
8
52 
199
 
62 
67 
 
49 
83
37 
37 
  1997 
   N 
 
11 
9 
 
54 
38 
45 
74
50 
54
15 
27
20 
9
38 
211
 
36 
75 
 
54 
87
29 
40 
0%  1997 
 
2 
(22)
 
5 
(13)
15 
(20)
6 
(11)
8 
(30)
4 
(44)
40 
(16)
 
7 
(9)
 
27 
(31)
7 
(18) 
]0-5]%  1997 
 
3 
(33) 
 
4 
(11) 
6 
(8)
1 
(2)
5 
(19)
1 
(12)
20 
(49)
 
9 
(12) 
 
6 
(7)
2 
(5) 
]5-20]%  1997 
 
0 
(0) 
 
0 
(0) 
3 
(4)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
0 
(0)
3 
(14)
 
0 
(0) 
 
1 
(1)
2 
(5) 
]20- % 
 
 
1997 
 
4 
(45) 
 
29 
(76) 
50 
(68)
47 
(87)
14 
(51)
4 
(44)
148 
(21)
 
59 
(79) 
 
53 
(61)
29 
(72) 
N  1997 
 
9 
(100) 
 
38 
(100) 
74 
(100)
54 
(100)
27 
(100)
9 
(100)
211 
(100)
 
75 
(100) 
 
87 
(100)
40 
(100)
missings excluded, 0' es included  
 
For the whole group investment has fallen from 1995 to 1997 seen in relation to 
fixed assets. The fall is especially steep for state, employee and no majority 
ownership as well as for the group of cooperative origin, while foreign and external 
domestic ownership has increased. For companies with very low fixed assets quite 
small investments in 1995 mean a steep increase in assets and explain why the ratio 
is lower in the following years although investment may have been stable or even 
increasing.  
This was in fact the situation for the three groups, as it can be seen from Table 
Q.14.2. Because of the quite low fixed assets in some companies this table probably 
gives the best indication for the differences in investment levels. Insider owned 
enterprises are low when using indicator, while foreign and external domestic 
ownership, and cooperatives 1995 and 1997 have  high investment levels. 
 
Table Q.14.2   Investment per employee - on ownership  
\majority ownership 
Lats 
state  foreign domes-
tic 
mana- 
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
investment 
/employees 
1995 
   N 
23 
24 
31
31
48
 61
9
 40
7
 32
13
 8
32 
196 
21 
61 
14
 84
55
 39
 1996 
   N 
6 
5 
62
33
50 
71
11
 39
16
 35
14
 7
47 
192 
23 
62 
26
 81
75
 36
 1997 
   N 
22 
9 
46 
38
46
 74
19 
54
7
 27
36
 9
38 
211 
32 
75 
31
87
30
40
missings excluded, 0' es included 
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Table Q.15.1   Composition of products - on ownership  
\majority ownership 
 
state  foreign do-
mestic
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
product 1   
% of production 
1995 
   N 
71 
31 
71
30
69
57
72 
37
71 
28
61 
6
70 
189 
62 
69 
73 
81
71 
31
 1996 
   N 
70 
11 
73
33
69
73
72 
43
67 
33
81 
6
70 
201 
67 
69 
72 
84
71 
36
 1997 
   N 
65 
9 
75
35
68
65
69
52
76 
23
72 
7
70 
199 
68 
71 
73 
81
73 
40
product 1+2+3 
% of production 
1995 
   N 
96 
31 
98
30
95
57
97 
37
97 
28
98 
6
97 
189 
95 
69 
98 
71
98 
31
 1996 
   N 
99 
11 
98
33
96
73
98 
43
96 
33
98 
6
97 
201 
96 
69 
97 
84
97 
36
 1997 
   N 
100 
9 
97
35
96
65
97
52
96 
23
100 
7
97 
199 
96 
71 
97 
81
96 
40
product order  
1993 same as 1996 
8 
(73) 
1 
(25) 
4 
(13) 
14 
(28) 
6 
(16) 
3 
(15) 
1 
(25) 
29 
(20) 
12 
(20) 
9 
(14) 
product order 
1993 different 1996 
3 
(27) 
3 
(75) 
26 
(87) 
37 
(72) 
32 
(84) 
17 
(85) 
3 
(75) 
118 
(80) 
49 
(80) 
53 
(86) 
Missing values included as 0, if the firm has responded for one or two products that year. 
 
The enterprises were asked about the share of the three main products in different 
years. Change in products would show changes in these proportions and also 
change in the relative performance of the three products. However, the results show 
a quite stable pattern concerning product 1, and it also shows that the three main 
products in general covered nearly the whole production. The last two lines 
describes whether the order of importance of the three main products are the same 
for 1995 and 1997 or if they have changed. It can be seen that in general 80% of the 
companies have changed the composition, and in this respect foreign and insider 
owned enterprises are changing slightly more than the remaining groups. 
 
9. Conclusion 
The main research questions concerned the variation on different types of 
ownership - divided in majority ownership by state, foreign, domestic external, 
managers, other employees or no majority. The survey also distinguished between 
state owned, privatized, or established directly as new private firms. In this respect 
the definition of de novo-enterprises were not only based on size as in most other 
studies. In fact the results show that by 1997 a considerable number of new 
enterprises had more than 50 employees and some privatized enterprises had less 
than 50 employees. 
 
The research questions concerned the relation between ownership structures and:  
1: the relation between ownership and control;  
2: compensation systems for managers and other employees;  
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3: different forms of restructuring. 
1. How is the relation between difference types of ownership and the influence of 
different groups?  How is the owners’ governance of managers? 
For insider owned and for foreign owned companies there is a quite strong 
correspondence between the type of owners and their representation in the company 
boards. However, for state owned and externally domestic owned companies it is 
quite rare that these groups actually have the majority of seats in the board. Instead 
the managers and also other employees have a quite strong position. We assume 
that especially the higher ranks of other employees, specialist, are represented in the 
boards. This is confirmed by direct asking the managers about their perception of 
the influence of different groups on different decision areas. In general managers 
are considered to have the highest influence on decisions in all areas. Other 
employees are ranking second, but significantly lower than managers. In the area of 
selection of managers, foreign, external domestic and employees match manager’s 
influence, but for other areas other owner groups are perceived to have much lower 
influence than managers. The managers perceive that they have more influence on 
strategic decisions in management owned enterprises than in other ownership types. 
In employee owned firms the employees are not considered to have more influence 
than in other enterprises where they do not have a majority of the ownership. The 
highest influence areas for other employees are on safety and health. 
 
Unions have a slightly declining rate of membership in all types of enterprises. The 
fall is especially steep in employee owned enterprises. 99% of the new enterprises 
have no unions. Employee influence through unions is most important in state 
owned enterprises. Other procedures for influence than through unions are most 
important in employee owned enterprises and in no-majority companies. In 
employee owned companies it is in fact influence through shareholding that is 
considered to be the most important channel of influence. It is worth noting that this 
type of influence for employees is also considered to have high importance in 
companies with domestic external ownership and with no-majority ownership, 
indicating that employees often have influence through minority shares in these 
types of companies. Whereas in companies with foreign or manager majority 
employees do not have much influence as shareholders.  
 
2. Do the compensation systems for managers and other employees vary with the 
different type of ownership structures? In these preliminary results we found only 
insignificant variations between different groups of majority/dominant owners and 
also a quite stable relation over the investigated time period.  
 
3. Do the degree and type of restructuring vary over time and between the different 
types of ownership? The differences between owner-groups are modest concerning 
organizational changes of number of departments and changes in hierarchical 
levels. Concerning orientation toward Western markets there is an increasing trend 
for all enterprises, but with foreign owned companies in a leading position. Foreign 
owned enterprises also have higher investment levels measured per employee. 
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Concerning the source of financing for different owner groups the traditional 
finding is confirmed for employee owned companies in relation to their dependence 
on internally generated capital. Extra capital injected from external owners play an 
important role only for foreign, managerial and no majority enterprises.    
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ESA-ID.................. 
 
Questionnaire to be Completed by person interviewing the Top Manager of the firm  
 
Enterprise governance and restructuring. 
This project is for Estonia done in cooperation with the ESA, Eesti Statistikaamet, and Copen-
hagen Busineess School. The objective of the project is to analyze the relation between 
different ownership structures and organizational structures and restructuring of the enterprise. 
For this purpose top-managers in 100-200 enterprises in each of the three Baltic countries will 
be interviewed.The collected data will be treated as strictly confidential. The enterprises will be 
treated as anony-mous entities and it will not be possible to identify specific enterprises in the 
published results. 
 
Niels Mygind director     Eesti Statitikaamet 
Center for East European Studies                                              Endla 15    
Copenhagen Business School                                                    0100 Tallinn 
Dalgas Have 15, 2000 F, Denmark                                             Estonia 
phone +45 38 15 30 32,  fax +45 38 15 30 37                            phone 69 59 202  fax 45 39 23 
 
  
 
I   Organization, Management and Board Structure 
 
Q1/ a) Who appointed you? (top manager)         _______ 
[Enter from following list: 1 = by state ministry or any state administration; 2 = elected by 
labor collective; 3 = elected by a meeting of shareholders; 4 = by state property 
fund/privatization agency; 5 = by meeting of company board; 6 = other  
b) When were you  appointed?  Year_______  Month_______ 
 
Q2  Composition of Company Board (for 1996 nougoku):    1997 1996   1995   1994   1993 
(if not existing, write 0 in the first line, question a) 
a) What is the number of members of the board?             ____   ____ ____              ____ 
 How many of the board-members represents   
 b) the state or local municipalities?   ____    ____ ____              ____ 
 c) foreigners or foreign companies?   ____ ____ ____              ____ 
 d) domestic private external owners?   ____ ____ ____              ____ 
 e) insiders ?      ____ ____ ____              ____ 
  f) managers ?     ____ ____ ____              ____ 
  g) other employees    ____ ____ ____              ____ 
 
Q3/ a) Does (did) the contract for the top manager provide  for remuneration that depends on 
the company's overall results?      1=Yes ; 2 = No   1997   1996   1995   1994    1993
                    ____   ____              ____    ____ 
b) What was the criterion?   
1. Profit ; 2 Sales; 3 = Other (specify)    ____   ____              ____    ____ 
    
c) What % of total pay was accounted for by this  criterion?   ____   ____              ____   ____  
 
Q4 Important changes in the organization, 1 = Yes; 2 = No  1997   1996   1995    1994    1993 
a) Have you changed the number of departments?  ____   ____               ____    ____ 
b) have you changed the number of hierachical levels? ____   ____               ____    ____  
c) Have you sold or closed down parts of the enterprise? ____   ____               ____    ____  
d) Have you included some new units in the enterprise? ____   ____               ____    ____  
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e) Other important changes in the organization  ____   ____               ____    ____ 
 specify:_______________________ 
  
II   Compensation System 
 
Q5/ How much was the average monthly salary for 1997 1996  1995   1994     1993 
a) the topmanager                _____ _____  _____   _____   _____ 
b) all employees                _____ _____  _____   _____   _____ 
c) the lowest paid employee               _____ _____  _____   _____   _____ 
 
Q6/ What was the main form of payment   1997 1996 1995      1994      1993 
for the largest group of production workers:   ____ ____      ____      ____     ____      
 
[Use this list;1 = Time rate (hourly); 2 = Time rate (weekly, monthly); 3 = Piece rate;  
4 =  Other(specify)____________________________]                 
 
Q7/ Additional payment systems. Non-managerial employees. Did the establishment operate 
a 
[1=Yes; 2 = No]                       1997    1996     1995      1994     1993            
profit sharing payment system*  ____ ____     ____      ____     ____      
monetary incentive scheme**      ____ ____     ____      ____     ____      
 
[* Profit-sharing payment systems pay all or part of wages and salaries on the basis of the 
total establishment's performance (eg based on net revenues or profits. 
** Monetary-incentive schemes are payments in addition to the basic wage made to motivate 
non-managerial employees. This is not directly linked to the level of profit or total revenue of 
the total establishment, but can be related to the result of a team/department. ] 
 
Q8/ Approximately what per cent of production worker earnings were paid in non-monetary 
benefits (e.g.food, consumer goods, holiday facilities, etc.)? 
in 1997_____%     in 1996_____%      in 1995_____%      in 1994_____%     in 1993_____ %  
 
IIl   Inputs and Outputs 
 
Q9/ Rank the following according to their importance as   sources for financing investment  
[1 = Most important, 2 = Next most important,...., 7 = Least Important; 0 = not used] 
                               1997   1993      
Savings inside the company (profits)  _____  _____ 
Extra capital from the owners                _____  _____ 
Allocation by the government   _____ _____   
Loan from banks or  investment funds     _____ _____  
Domestic private capital   _____ _____  
Foreign private capital (not owners)  _____ _____  
Investments by other establishments  _____ _____  
                           
Q10  (a) Rank the following as sources of the firm's material inputs 
[1 = most important, 2 = next most important, 3 = least important, 0 = not used] 
                               1997      1996      1995      1994       1993  
Imports from Eastern Europe   ____      ____      ____      ____       ____ 
Imports from Western Europe  ____      ____      ____      ____       ____ 
Local production              ____      ____      ____      ____       ____ 
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Q11  For your main product     1997  1996  1995  1994  1993 
a) how many other domestic firms compete with you?             ____  ____  ____  ____ 
b) how many foreign firms compete with you?                    ____  ____  ____  ____ 
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Q12 (a)What percent of your turnover   1997 1996  1995   1994   1993 
is exported to Eastern Europe?           ___% ___%  ___% ___%  ___% 
(b) What percent of your volume  
of production is exported to the West?        ___%   ___%  ___% ___% ___% 
 
Q13 a) Did you use your workforce 100% of the time 1997 1996   1995   1994  1993 
or lower?  Specify average ulitilization percentage:  ___% ___% ___% ___% ___% 
(example: reduced working hours because of lack of order  
 means a lower percentage holidays or lower hours requested  
 by the employees do not mean a lower percentage)     
b) How high was the capacity utilization  
of plant and equipment on average?     ___% ___% ___% ___% ___% 
 
c) (i) Could you have produced a similar volume of production with fewer workers?            
        1997 1996   1995   1994   1993 
        1 = Yes, 2 = No                       ____ ____   ____   ____   ____ 
    
(ii) If yes,approximately what percentage of fewer workers? ___% ___% ___% ___% ___% 
 
Q14 How much was spent on investment on fixed assets? 
1997  1996  1995   1994     1993 
________                   ________   _________    ________ 
 
Q15 How big a percentage of total production  
made approximately the three main products in ? 1997 1996   1995     1994    1993 
product 1 (specify)...........................   ___% ___%  ___% ___%  ___% 
product 2 (specify)...........................   ___%   ___% ___% ___% ___% 
product 3 (specify)...........................   ___%   ___% ___% ___% ___% 
 
 
IV   Labor Management Relations      
1997   1996   1995   1994   1993 
Q16/a)How many workers were members of labor unions?  ____   ____   ____   ____    ____  
      
b)To how many different unions did they belong?   ____   ____   ____   ____    ____ 
 
Q 17(a) Besides trade union structures, does your firm have any other procedure in which 
representatives of employees regularly meet with management to discuss policies at 
company-level?   1 = Yes; 2 = No  _______ 
 
(b) What is this structure?     ___________________________ 
 
(c) Rank the following structures in terms of their importance for enabling employees to 
exercise influence over company decisions concerning labor: 
[1 = most, ......, 3 = least, 0 = not relevant]    1997   1996   1995   1994   1993 
 trade unions              ____   ____   ____   ____   ____ 
 Employees as shareholders      ____   ____   ____   ____   ____ 
 Other structure (as in part (b)        ____   ____   ____   ____   ____ 
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Q18 For the following different issues, what was the influence of the following groups: 
1 = high influence,  2 = some influence,  3 =  low or no influence 
a: 1997                             groups 
issues 
managers other 
em-ployees 
Est. private 
ext.owners 
foreign 
ext.owners 
state and 
municipality 
1.long term plans for production      
2.introduction of new technology      
3.selection of managers      
4.employment reduction/increase      
5.wage-levels      
6.safe and health at the workplace      
 
a: 1996                             groups 
issues 
managers other 
em-ployees 
Est. private 
ext.owners 
foreign 
ext.owners 
state and 
municipality 
1.long term plans for production      
2.introduction of new technology      
3.selection of managers      
4.employment reduction/increase      
5.wage-levels      
6.safe and health at the workplace      
 
a: 1995                             groups 
issues 
managers other 
em-ployees 
Est. private 
ext.owners 
foreign 
ext.owners 
state and 
municipality 
1.long term plans for production      
2.introduction of new technology      
3.selection of managers      
4.employment reduction/increase      
5.wage-levels      
6.safe and health at the workplace      
 
a: 1994                             groups 
issues 
managers other 
em-ployees 
Est. private 
ext.owners 
foreign 
ext.owners 
state and 
municipality 
1.long term plans for production      
2.introduction of new technology      
3.selection of managers      
4.employment reduction/increase      
5.wage-levels      
6.safe and health at the workplace      
 
a: 1993                             groups 
issues 
managers other 
em-ployees 
Est. private 
ext.owners 
foreign 
ext.owners 
state and 
municipality 
1.long term plans for production      
2.introduction of new technology      
3.selection of managers      
4.employment reduction/increase      
5.wage-levels      
6.safe and health at the workplace      
 
